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Abstract
In this paper we propose a mechanism for the allocation of pipeline capacities, assum-
ing that the participants bidding for capacities do have subjective evaluation of various
network routes. The proposed mechanism is based on the concept of bidding for route-
quantity pairs. Each participant defines a limited number of routes and places multiple
bids, corresponding to various quantities, on each of these routes. The proposed mech-
anism assigns a convex combination of the submitted bids to each participant, thus its
called convex combinatorial auction. The capacity payments in the proposed model are
determined according to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves principle. We compare the efficiency
of the proposed algorithm with a simplified model of the method currently used for pipeline
capacity allocation in the EU (simultaneous ascending clock auction of pipeline capaci-
ties) via simulation, according to various measures, such as resulting utility of players,
utilization of network capacities, total income of the auctioneer and fairness.
1 Introduction
The European natural gas network represents an enormous infrastructure system, which
is also constantly in the focus of geopolitics [1, 6]. In the traditional model, national or
multinational energy companies built their own pipelines requiring huge investments, and
expected that their latter trade transactions using the pipeline will provide them with
sufficient returns. Nowadays, exclusive ownership is not the general institutional setting.
Many pipelines within the European Union are subject to regulated third party access
(TPA). Since the early 1990s, the EU have adopted a number of increasingly assertive
directives and regulations to develop the common market for gas by ensuring fair TPA
access to the transportation system within the Union — see [7, 8, 9, 2, 11]. According to
this scheme, the member countries have established a system of transport fees overseen
by a regulatory authority. Under such a regime, the owner of a pipeline no longer enjoys
exclusive right over the transport capacities. Instead, he has to grant access, provided he
is compensated according to the regulated tariff. Cooperative game theoretic analysis of
TPA and the implied transfer profits in natural gas networks has been proposed in [3].
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1.1 Motivation: Current practice of pipeline network capac-
ity allocation in the EU
A decade ago, regulations of the third energy package [10] basically separated the network
operation from the trading and supply, expanded the rights of regulation authorities, and
created the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), and the European
Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). As a result, in the last 10
years, the bias of trading already significantly shifted from long term (usually fixed-price)
contracts to more liquid trading platforms (markets corresponding to so called gas hubs).
In this framework, to provide infrastructure for such increasingly interactive trading, the
transmission system operators (TSOs) market the transfer capacities of pipelines as stan-
dardized products of variable time-frames (from yearly to intra-day intervals). According
to the reports of [4], the volume of engagements corresponding to short-time products
constantly increases. The efficiency of capacity bookings in Germany has been discussed
by [14].
As long as the capacities required for the planned trade transactions do not exceed
the pipeline capacities, allocation is simple, and it practically means only administration.
However if the available capacities are not enough to satisfy all participants aiming to
allocate capacities in the network, some kind of capacity-allocation method must be used
to distribute the available pipeline capacities among participants (players) who apply for
them. The first auction, which coordinated the long-term bookings of available existing
and future pipeline capacities on the EU-level has been held in 2017 March on the PRISMA
auction platform. During this auction, yearly, quarterly and monthly pipeline capacity
products have been auctioned simultaneously using an ascending clock auction (ACA).
Altogether 2165 unique auctions took place on 6 March for each point and each year. As
pointed out by [17], in most of the cases no real competition emerged, and as the result
of this auction, the dominant market player (GAZPROM) was able to acquire the great
majority of high-importance capacity licenses for in some cases as long as 20 years (for
example, all interconnection capacities on the border of Slovakia have been booked for
20-25 years by GAZPROM).
Several factors may be identified as underlying causes for this result. First, Russia,
unlike other suppliers of Europe, like Algeria or Norway, typically delivers gas to the
border of the importer country, thus countries which import gas from Russia do have
modest interest in acquiring transport routes. The reasons for this are partially historical
– in deals of the former decades, the market power of GAZPROM was very high, so
importers were compelled to agree with such details of bargains.
Second, if a large producer supplying a significant number of clients aims to buy ca-
pacities for his deliveries, all the delivery paths in question originate from the production
site, and they have potentially large overlaps (see e.g. the Nord Stream I and II and their
connected pipelines, which will practically supply the majority of Europe). In this case, it
is easy to identify pipelines and interconnection points which are critical for these delivery
projects, and thus represent high value for the player. In other words, the optimal bidding
strategy of such large producers is quite straightforward in the current framework, while
they typically also have the resources to obtain capacity licenses for long periods.
In contrast, the optimal bidding strategy in the current framework is not trivial for
smaller consumers. Consumers typically buy gas the on established hubs, the prices of
which may be different and also uncertain regarding longer periods (e.g. years) for which
capacity may be booked in the present system. Such hubs correspond to market areas,
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inside which the physical transportation of gas is the responsibility of the TSO. The
article of [14] discusses the implications of these market areas in Germany, and analyzes
the efficiency of inter-area capacity bookings.
Overall, it can be said that the current allocation practice and the respective algorithms
do have their pros and cons, but in general it is reasonable to ask if there’s any alternative to
the current method of capacity allocation. In the current paper we propose exactly such an
alternative approach, called convex combinatorial auction (CCA) of pipeline capacities. As
a first step, we define and test this method on an abstract model under several simplifying
assumptions (see subsection 2.1).
We consider a scenario where, under the principle of regulated third party access,
local (national) TSOs have the right to determine transfer fees for their pipelines, but the
pipeline capacity licenses are allocated by a central authority via auction. We compare the
newly proposed CCA-based allocation to the allocation based on the simultaneous ACA,
assuming a simple but reasonable optimal bidding strategy of the participants of the ACA
(see subsection 2.3.2). We use various measures for the comparison, such as resulting
utility of players, utilization efficiency of network infrastructure, total amount of payment
for the capacity rights (income of the auctioneer) and fairness. The structure of the paper
is as follows. In section 2 we define the principles of the used model of the network, and the
algorithms modelling the ACA and CCA based allocations, and demonstrate the concepts
on a simple, small example. In section 3, we perform simulations on high numbers of
randomized scenarios to get statistical data about the performance of the two methods
and summarize the respective results. Section 4 discusses the results of the simulations
and the properties of the two different allocation mechanisms, while section 5 concludes.
2 Materials and methods
In the following, an example with a simple network will be introduced to demonstrate
the modelling and simulation assumptions corresponding to the two allocation methods
considered.
After defining the network and related parameters, we will first discuss the simulation
of the ACA for the allocation of pipeline capacities, and determine the resulting capacity
rights, payments and utilities in this framework, which is motivated by the current practice
of the EU for capacity allocation [12]. Following this, we introduce the proposed alternative
method, the CCA, demonstrate how it can be applied to the proposed example, and
compare the results with the outcome of the ACA.
In this proposed simple example, we will focus on consumers, and we will assume that
they are the only participants of the capacity auction. Regarding realistic scenarios, at
least in addition to local gas distribution companies, who may be considered as consumers,
multinational energy companies and traders are also present as typical bidders of such
auctions. The benefit of considering only consumers as bidders is however that, as we will
see, according to their explicit demand elasticity characterization, their rational bidding
strategy (under a few additional assumptions in the case of ACA) may be easily derived
– this task would be much more harder in the case of agents representing multinational
companies with more complex incentives.
In the current work we focus on long-term capacity rights. The regulation [12] defines
yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily and within-day capacity products, from which the first
three are sold via the ACA algorithm. In other words this means that if one is willing to
3
allocate capacities for the first month of the year, he/she has 3 opportunities to do it.
Motivated by this, our model of the ACA process will have three steps. In the first step
we assume that all capacities of the network in question are subject to auction. After the
first step has finished, remaining (not-allocated capacities) are subject to the second round
of ACA auctions, and so similarly, the remaining not-allocated capacities are subject to
the last round of ACA auctions1.
2.1 Modelling assumptions and the example network
2.1.1 Market areas and their representation in the model
As discussed by [14], market areas (MAs) are sets of physical network nodes, between
which the transportation of gas is the responsibility of the TSOs. Network users are able
to inject gas at any entry point of the MA and withdraw gas at any exit point that belongs
to the same MA, if they have the capacity rights for the respective entry and exit points.
Some entry points of a MA may correspond to production sites, while others may represent
incoming pipelines. Let us note, that multiple such pipelines exists (see Fig. 3 in [14]).
In the terms of our model, the nodes represent MAs, and the edges represent the
capacities connecting them. According to the above considerations, it is possible that
more than one edge is present between two nodes. Although we do not consider such cases
in the paper, the model is capable of handling these scenarios.
2.1.2 Bundled products and their representation in the model
Similar to transfer fees, capacity products in the practical European system (PRISMA - see
https://www.prisma-capacity.eu/) are also considered corresponding to the entry and
exit points of MAs. The basic reason for this is that the transfer capacities are managed
locally by the TSO’s of the respective price zone. To make the life of bidders easier, the
capacity allocation platform defines so called bundled products, composed of an exit and
an entry capacity. This means that if I’d like to transfer from node A to node B, I have
the possibility to bid for a bundled AB product, in which the exit capacity of A and the
entry capacity of B are included. These bundled products are handled in the PRISMA
system in a way, which ensures that the total entry and exit capacities of price zones are
respected.
For the aim of simplicity, in the used modelling framework we consider only such
bundled capacity products. Let us note however, that the used methodology may be
easily generalized to a more detailed scenario. The current model takes capacity from A
to B into account as a product, if node A is connected to node B. If one would like to
consider entry and exit capacities distinctly, an intermedier node X may be introduced
on the edge A-B. In this case the edge A-X represents the entry and exit capacities of A,
while the edge X-B represents the entry and exit capacities of zone B.
2.1.3 The example network
Modelling the sources and source costs In the proposed model framework it is
assumed that natural gas is available at distinguished nodes (representing market areas),
1Let us note that according to the current practice, 10 % of the available transfer capacity is reserved for
short term trading.
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from where consumers must ensure themselves routes to transport it to consumption sites.
In the current model we assume that these sources are able to provide arbitrary quantities
on prices, which are fixed for the period in question (for which we consider the allocation
of transfer capacities). Let us note that in the case of realistic scenarios, the price of
natural gas at the trading hubs may be significantly volatile, and depends on the nature
of the source as well (obtained e.g. from actual transports, gas reservoirs or from LNG
terminals). According with the recent line of EU regulations, we assume that no price
differentiation is allowed at the market.
Let us consider the network depicted in Fig. 1. Based on the above considerations, the
source S1 in the model (at node 1) provides gas for every consumer at the same price (23
EUR/MMBtu – EUR per Million Metric British unit)
Figure 1: Example network. Each node and edge is labeled with its ID. S1 denotes the only
source present in this simple example network, while C1, C2, and C3 denote the consumers. c
t
i
denotes the transfer cost on line i, while qi denotes the maximal capacity of the line.
We assume one source (S1) located in node 1, and three consumers (C1 −C3) located
in nodes 2, 3 and 4 respectively. As in the current study we focus on network capacity
allocation, we assume that the sources can provide arbitrary quantities (we assume no
inlet limits).
We assign a direction to each edge, as denoted in the Figure, to account for positive
and negative flows, but we assume that the pipelines corresponding to the edges are bi-
directional, and their maximal transfer capacity (qj for pipeline j) is the same in both
directions. We also assume that the transfer cost for pipeline (ctj for pipeline j) is also the
same in the positive and in the negative direction. In practice, local TSOs set entry and
exit fees at interconnection points, but from these values transfer fees of a certain line i
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in the context of the model may be easily derived as the exit fee of the source point and
entry fee of the destination point.
q¯ ct
1 80 9
2 75 8
3 70 11
4 60 4
5 60 4.5
6 60 5
Table 1: Edge parameters in the network of example 1: Maximal capacity (q¯) and transfer cost
(ct).
Consumer demand We use piecewise constant inverse demand curves for the de-
scription of demand elasticity as depicted in Fig. 2. Each piecewise constant part has two
parameters: A price (P ) and a consumption quantity (Q). In this formalism P ij denotes
the price level of the j-th step of the inverse demand function of player i. The parameters
of the demand functions used in the example and depicted ion Fig. 2 are summarized in
Table 2.
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Figure 2: Inverse demand functions of consumers assumed in Example 1. MMBtu stands for
million metric British unit.
P 11 47 P
2
1 46 P
3
1 53 Q
1
1 50 Q
2
1 40 Q
3
1 50
P 12 39 P
2
2 38 P
3
2 49 Q
1
2 40 Q
2
2 45 Q
3
2 35
P 13 30 P
2
3 32 P
3
3 36 Q
1
3 35 Q
2
3 35 Q
3
3 45
Table 2: parameters of the inverse demand functions considered in the example.
2.2 General assumptions
We assume a central regulatory authority who has the exclusive right to sell pipeline
capacity licenses for market participants, who, according to their individual positions
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and demand functions, have different evaluations for particular routes in the network.
Participants do have a strategy space – they decide which bids they would like to submit,
thus they can be considered as players of the game. For the clarification of the terminology,
we will use ’participants’ and ’players’ as synonyms in the rest of the paper. In this
paper we will assume that the exclusive participants of the capacity allocation game are
consumers of the model, since, as mentioned earlier, their optimal bidding strategy may
be plausibly derived from the modelling assumptions via simple computations in both of
the mechanisms analyzed.
2.3 Bidding and capacity allocation in the ascending clock
auction (ACA) framework
In the following we summarize the assumptions by which the bidding behavior in our model
is described, and evaluate the ACC auction based on the principles laid down in [12]. The
ACA auction process is carried out simultaneously for each line. Let us summarize the
critical points which are defined in the regulation, regarding our auction model.
• Ascending clock auctions shall enable network users to place volume bids against
escalating prices announced in consecutive bidding rounds, starting at the reserve
price P0.
• The volume bid per network user at a specific price shall be equal to or less than the
volume bid placed by this network user in the previous round.
• If the aggregate demand across all network users is less than or equal to the capacity
offered at the end of the first bidding round, the auction shall close.
• If the aggregate demand across all network users is greater than the capacity offered
at the end of the first bidding round or a subsequent bidding round, a further bidding
round shall be opened with a price equal to the price in the previous bidding round,
plus the large price step.
• If a first-time undersell occurs, a price reduction shall take place and a further bidding
round shall be opened. The further bidding round will have a price equal to the price
applicable in the bidding round preceding the first-time undersell, plus the small price
step. Further bidding rounds with increments of the small price step shall then be
opened until the aggregate demand across all network users is less than or equal to
the capacity offered, at which point the auction shall close.
In the above mechanism the clear aim of the large and small price steps is to reduce the
number of bidding rounds (the auction switches to small price steps before the undersell).
For the aim of simplicity, in our simulations we use only one step size, which is small
enough to capture the details of the change of individual evaluations as the price of a
certain line increases: It is easy to see that as every source cost, transfer cost, and demand
function parameters are defined as integers, a step size smaller than the unit will not
make any difference to the bidders in their evaluations (if the price started from an integer
value). Thus in our simulations, we will assume that the price of every capacity product
is increased by 1 in every step, if no undersell occurs.
In our simulation we assume that in the beginning, no capacities are allocated, every
transfer capacity is subject to the auction. This means that we will have 12 products:
capacities corresponding to positive and negative directions for each edge. According to
the principles described in [12], the initial price of capacity products are set to cover
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only the expanses of the TSO. As the proposed model considers transfer prices separately
(not included in capacity prices), this implies that we assume that the initial price of the
capacity products is 0.
According to the considerations discussed before in subsection 1, we simulate 3 rounds
of ACA auctions, each with the starting price of one unit for each active product.
To clarify the terminology, each auction round begins with the declaration of capacities
under auction (and the initial prices of them, which is assumed to be 0), and after the
submission of bids to every active product, the prices of overbidded products increase in
every step of the actual auction by 1 unit. If the total amount of submitted bids for a
certain capacity are less than the volume of the particular capacity, the product becomes
passive, and capacities are allocated according to the last submitted bids. The auction
round ends, if all products become passive.
2.3.1 Bid format in the ACA auction
The bid format in the ACA is simple. In each bidding round, we have active products, for
which bids may be still placed and closed products, for which the capacity is over. In the
initial round all products are active. In our case the products are the + and - directional
transfer capacities of the pipelines, namely
[q+
1
q+
2
q+
3
q+
4
q+
5
q+
6
q−
1
q−
2
q−
3
q−
4
q−
5
q−
6
]
Each player must define the bid quantities he/she places on the active products in each
round, in other words the overall bid of a player is defined by a vector.
In the next subsection we describe how we model the optimal bidding strategy of
participants in these framework.
2.3.2 Modelling of optimal bidding in the ACA framework
Calculations during the steps of an ACA Let us first emphasize that in the
current model we assume that players have perfect information about source and transfer
costs of the network (and of course about the actual prices of capacities in the auction),
but they have no information about other player’s utility functions. In other words, in the
current simulation framework player do not make any speculations of other player’s bids
to optimize their own bidding strategy, they just consider the network parameters, the
actual capacity prices in the particular step of the actual auction, and their own inverse
demand function to determine their bids for the actual bidding step.
In the proposed modelling formalism we distinguish between already allocated capac-
ities, and potential capacities. In a general case (e.g. if we are not considering the first
bidding round), players may hold already allocated capacities. To be more precise, we
assume that after the yearly auction finishes, each player assigns flows to the capacities,
he/she obtained at the end of the auction to maximize its utility via fulfilling the demand
in the respective consumer node. However, after the determination of these flows, some
capacities may remain unused – these are considered as free-to-use already allocated capac-
ities in the following (since the payment for them has already been completed). A simple
example for such a scenario may be considered, if a player bids for several components
(e.g. 2 line capacities) of a route, receives one of them in the early steps of the auction,
but during the following steps the price of the other one increases so much that it does
not make sense for the player to maintain its bid anymore. This way the player will be
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probably not able to assign any flow to this single capacity, thus he/she will have unused
capacity at the end of the first round, which will be considered as already allocated capac-
ity in the second bidding round. Capacities still under auction are considered differently,
since the payment for them has not been completed yet (using them implies additional
cost, since they must be acquired first at their actual price).
To exactly determine the actual bids of a player in a given auction step, we use the
principle of optimal potential flows. This approach means the following. In each step of
any auction round (1 2 or 3), players determine their optimal flows, which maximizes their
resulting utility U , assuming that they will receive the capacities on which they place bids.
The resulting utility may be calculated as the utility of consumption at the consumer node
UC , minus the cost of transfers (CT ) and inlets (CI), minus the payment for the capacity
rights (CC). In this calculation the player takes into account that flows planned on already
allocated capacities do not imply furthers costs in addition to the transfer cost, in contrast
flows planned on potential capacities imply additional cost, namely the actual capacity
price.
In our model, players submit bids according to these optimal actual flows, namely
we assume that they submit a bid vector, which is able to ensure the flows on potential
capacities calculated in the optimal actual flows problem.
The formalism of the approach is the following. Let us consider a linear programming
problem, as
max U(x) where x =


faac
fcau
I
Y

 s.t
0 ≤ faac ≤ AAC
0 ≤ fcua ≤ CUA
0 ≤ fcua ≤ PB
0 ≤ I
0 ≤ Y ≤ Y
Aeqx = 0 (1)
In the above notation, faac denotes the vector of flows on already allocated capacities, and
may be decomposed as
faac =
(
f+aac
f−aac
)
(2)
where f+aac stands for the positive directional flows (according to the directions of edges)
and f−aac denotes the negative directional flows. fcau denotes the flows on capacities under
auction (potential capacities), and it has the same structure as f−aac. f
+
aac, f
−
aac, f
+
cau, f
−
cau ∈
Rm, where m is the number of edges (6 in the case of the proposed example).
I ∈ Rns denotes the vector of inlet values (ns stands for the number of source-nodes,
and equals to 1 in the defined example), while Y describes the consumption. To each
piecewise constant part of the inverse demand function of the respective player (these are
depicted in Fig. 2), we assign a variable yk, so Y ∈ Rnp , where np is the number of these
piecewise constant parts (np = 3 for all 3 players in our case). As discussed previously, I
is the maximum inlet, while
Y =

 Q
i
1
Qi2
Qi3

 so Y =

 y1y2
y3

 ≤

 Q
i
1
Qi2
Qi3

 (3)
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where the Qi1 values depend on the actual player i.
The parameter vector AAC holds the already allocated capacity values for each edge-
direction pair. CUA stands for the vector of capacities currently under auction. PB
stands for the value of the previous bid vector submitted by the player. This constant is
necessary, since the rules of the ACA discussed in subsection 2.3 state that ’volume bid
per network user at a specific price shall be equal to or less than the volume bid placed by
this network user in the previous round’.
The equation Aeqx = 0 formalizes the nodal balances. For each node, the inlets plus
the inflows must be equal to the outflows plus the consumption. Using the variables in x,
and the network topology, the n equations corresponding to the rows of the Aeq matrix
may be easily derived (n is the number of nodes).
Finally U(x) stands for the resulting utility of the actual player, and may be decom-
posed as U = UC −CT −CI − CC , where, as discussed previously, UC denotes the utility
of consumption, CT and CI denote the cost of transfers and inlets, and CC denotes the
payment for the capacity rights. It is clear that UC , CT and CI are linear functions of the
variables of x – the coefficients of the linear functions may be derived from the P ij values,
the ct transfer costs (defined for the edges in Table 1), the inlet cost per unit (23 in our
case). Finally, CC may be derived from the actual prices present in the auction step.
After each step, according to the potential allocations (if for any product, if there’s no
overbidding, the auction for that product is finished, it will be allocated at the actual price
to the actual bidders), the values of already allocated capacities (AAC) and the capacities
under auction (CUA) are updated.
Calculations between ACA rounds After a round of ACA auction has finished,
each player calculates the optimal flows on the capacities actually allocated to him/her.
This can be done easily by solving 1, under the assumption that there are no capacities un-
der auction, only already allocated capacities. According to the results of this calculation,
every player performs the two following operations:
1. First, the player in question determines the quantity ensured by the calculated flows.
As this quantity is ensured for him/her in the following, the player updates its inverse
demand function for the remaining auction steps accordingly (demand is reduced by
the already accessible quantity).
2. Second, the player divides the capacities allocated to him/her into two groups: Ca-
pacities which are used by the flows are considered ’out of the game’ in the following,
thus they are allocated to the flows fixed after this round. Allocated capacities on
the other hand which are not used in the flows are considered as already allocated
capacities in the next auction round (payment for them has been already completed,
thus they may be used in the design of potential optimal flows in the following).
2.3.3 Results of the ACA process for the simple example
According to the principles discussed above, the three rounds of ACA auctions may be
simulated for the proposed simple example. The details of the calculations can be found
in Appendix A.
The resulting capacity allocation of the ACA process is described by the matrix detailed
in E.q. (4) (where rows correspond to players 1-3) and results in the resulting utility vector
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[U1ACA U
2
ACA U
3
ACA] = [720 400 1325]. Thus the total utility of players (U
T
ACA) equals
2445 in this case.
ACACA =

 0 0 0 10 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15

 (4)
Let us introduce some further characteristic values as bases for latter comparison. The
total payment received by the auctioneer (
∑
CC) for the auctioned capacities is 700 units
in this case. We can furthermore characterize how much the available infrastructure is
utilized. If we consider the total transfer capacity of the network versus the amount of
capacity allocated via the process and versus the capacity actually used by the players
at the end in their resulting optimal flows on their available capacities, we can calculate
that the ratio of allocated network capacities (rANC) is 0.321 while the ratio of network
capacities which are used in the end (rUNC) is 0.2963 (let us note that one edge is typically
used in one direction, but capacity products for both directions are present in the auction,
thus total usage ratios over 0.5 are very unlikely).
In the following we introduce the convex combinatorial auction and demonstrate its
functioning and results in the case of the introduced example.
2.4 The convex combinatorial auction (CCA) for the alloca-
tion of network capacities
As we will see, the CCA framework uses a route-centered formalism. Our first task in this
approach is to define the routes of players, via which they are potentially able to transport
the gas for themselves. We consider the following routes for player 1 2 and 3 respectively:
R11 -1
R12 -2, 4
R13 -3, 5
R14 -2, -6, 5
R15 -3, 6, 4
R21 -2
R22 -1, -4
R23 -3, 5,-4
R24 -3, 6
R31 -3
R32 -1, -5
R33 -2, -6
R34 -2, 4,-5
Table 3: Routes of players considered in the proposed example. Every route is a set of edges
leading from the source to the consumer. The signs are positive if the direction of the edge
coincides with the route.
In this setup we suppose that players may submit bids for route-quantity pairs, ac-
cording to the principle that in the outcome of the auction a convex combination of their
submitted bids will be assigned to them. This assumption allows bidding for alternative
routes: If a consumer needs 1 unit of gas and there are 2 alternative sources in the network,
corresponding to two different routes, he/she can submit two bids for the capacity licenses
of the two distinct routes, both with the quantity of 1 unit. At the end of the auction a
convex combination of the two bids will be assigned to him, which means that he/she will
not get more network capacity towards the sources than 1 unit, but this maximally 1 unit
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may be composed of arbitrary proportion of the two routes. Of course this line of thought
applies for a single source with multiple access routes as well.
2.4.1 Bid format in the CCA auction
As mentioned earlier, in the CCA framework participants of the auction may submit
bids for route-quantity pairs. Let us denote the k-th bid for route j of player i with
Bij,k = (q
i
j,k, p
i
j,k) where q
i
j,k is the quantity of the bid, and p
i
j,k is the price offered for the
route-quantity pair in question.
2.4.2 Variables of the clearing problem
xij,k ∈ [0, 1] denotes the acceptance indicator of the bid B
i
j,k.
2.4.3 Constraints
Network constraints: To formulate the constraints which describe the limited ca-
pacity of pipelines, we need to decompose the routes considered in the auction to their
components – to edges which correspond to pipelines. Furthermore we take into account
the possibility that counter-directed flows cancel each other.
Let us denote the set of (directed) edges in the network with E, while e ∈ E denotes a
single edge. Each route j (of player i) may be represented as an Rij ⊆ E subset of edges,
where each element is signed, according to whether the direction of the route coincides
with the direction of the included edge or not.
Let us suppose furthermore that edge em has different maximal capacity in the pos-
itive and negative direction (think of one-directional pipelines), denoted by q¯+m and q¯
−
m
respectively.
In this case the maximal capacity constraints may be formulated as
∑
i,j,k em∈R
i
j
sij,m x
i
j,k q
i
j,k ≤ q¯
+
m
∑
i,j,k em∈R
i
j
−sij,m x
i
j,k q
i
j,k ≤ q¯
−
m ∀m (5)
where sij,m is an indicator variable, which equals to 1 if edge em has positive sign in
route j of player i, and -1 otherwise.
Maximal output limitations of sources in the network may be derived very similarly by
constraining the total outflow of the edges connected to the source in question.
Convexity constraint: By definition, the auction assigns to each player a convex
combination of his/her submitted bids. This consideration is formalized as
∑
j,k
xij,k ≤ 1 ∀i (6)
2.4.4 The optimization problem of the CCA framework
The objective of the optimization process is to maximize the nominal income from the
bids, under the previously detailed constraints.
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maxx x
i
j,kp
i
j,k s.t.
∑
i,j,k em∈R
i
j
sij,m x
i
j,k q
i
j,k ≤ q¯
+
m ∀m
∑
i,j,k em∈R
i
j
−sij,m x
i
j,k q
i
j,k ≤ q¯
−
m ∀m
∑
j,k x
i
j,k ≤ 1 ∀i
(7)
The above problem falls into the class of linear programming problems. Let us recall
that regarding the ACA framework, we only used linear programming to model optimal
bidding behavior, but the allocation itself in that case has been performed by a logical
algorithm described in subsection 2.3. In contrast, in the case of CCA, the allocation
process itself relies on solving a linear programming problem. Let us point out here
however that in other auction framework related to energy economics as electricity auctions
linear programming, and even more computationally demanding programming problems
(as integer and quadratic programming) are routinely used in practice (see e.g. [15]).
2.5 Payments
After the optimization process has been completed and the bid acceptance ratios have been
determined, the payments of the players have to be completed. To determine payments
in the proposed framework, we use the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [18,
13, 16], which charges each individual the harm they cause to other bidders with their
participation. The VCG mechanism gives bidders an incentive to bid their true valuations,
by ensuring that the optimal strategy for each bidder is to bid their true valuations of the
items. It is a generalization of a Vickrey auction [18] for multiple items. In the following,
we apply the proposed CCA framework for the simple example, and also detail how the
VCG-payments are calculated.
2.6 Results of the CCA process for the simple example
The first step is to derive the bids of the CCA approach. This may be done via simple
calculations, which are detailed in Appendix B. Considering the bids detailed in in Ap-
pendix B and calculating the optimum of the auction problem summarized in (7), we get
the following results.
• Regarding player 1, the nonzero acceptance indicators are x11,1 = 0.5 and x
1
1,2 = 0.5
resulting in the total capacity of 70 units on route R11 of player 1.
• Regarding player 2, the nonzero acceptance indicators are x21,1 = 0.6667 and x
2
1,2 =
0.3333, resulting in the capacity of 55 on route R21 of player 2.
• Regarding player 3, the relevant indicators are x31,2 = 0.8235 and x
3
3,2 = 0.1765,
resulting in the capacities of 70 and 15 on routes R31 and R
3
3.
From the resulting acceptance indicators, and from the bid and route data, we can
determined the allocated edge capacities
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ACCCA =

 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15

 (8)
If we compare the resulting capacity allocation of the CCA in eq. (8) to the resulting
allocation of the ACA in eq. (4), we can already see that the two methods result in
different allocations.
2.6.1 Determination of payments
As detailed in subsection 2.5, we use the VCG mechanism for the determination of capacity
payments. The payment of any player is equal to the harm its participation in the auction
implies for other players. The ’harm’ in our case is measures in the cumulative nominal
value of accepted bids for each player. Let us consider player 1.
In this case we have to first calculate the total nominal value of (at least partially)
accepted bids for players 2 and 3. If we consider the bid acceptance indicators detailed
above, and the CCA bid values detailed in Appendix B, we can see that the total nominal
bid value of Player 2 (TNBV 2) may be calculated as
TNBV 2 =
2
3
600 +
1
3
915 = 705
Similarly for Player 3,
TNBV 2 = 0.8235 · 1475 + 0.1765 · 1305 = 1445 ,
thus the total nominal bid value of Players 2 and 3 is 2150 in this case.
If we would like to know how much harm is implied by Player 1 to Players 2 and 3 by
its participation, we have to simply re-run the CCA allocation process, assuming no bids
for player 1. In this case we get the following results.
x21,2 = 0.8235 x
2
2,2 = 0.1765 (9)
x31,2 = 0.8235 x
3
2,2 = 0.1765 , (10)
implying the quantity of 70 on routes R21 and R
3
1 and the quantity of 15 on routes R
2
2 and
R32. The reason for this symmetry is that the if we consider the sum of the quantities of
the first two steps in the demand curves, we get 85 for both players 2 and 3 (40+45 vs 50
+ 35).
Let us now calculate the modified total nominal bid values (denoted by TNBVm)
TNBV 2m = 0.8235 · 915 + 0.1765 · 490 = 839.98 (11)
TNBV 3m = 0.8235 · 1475 + 0.1765 · 1262.5 = 1437.5 , (12)
thus the total nominal bid value of Players 2 and 3 is appr. 2277.5 in this case.
According to the VCG principles described in subsection 2.5, the capacity payment of
Player 1 is 2277.5-2150=127.5.
This process may be straightforwardly repeated for players 2 and 3 to determine the
capacity payments. In this case we get the result
[C1C C
2
C C
3
C ] = [127.5 80 115]
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2.6.2 Results of the CCA process for the simple example
After the allocated capacities have been determined, the optimal flows on the available ca-
pacities may be calculated for each player. This can be done similarly to the case described
in Appendix A in the ACA case, but in this case the optimal flows will correspond exactly
to the (possibly partially) accepted bid-quantity pairs on the respective routes. Knowing
the inlet costs, the transfer costs, the capacity costs and the resulting consumption values,
utility calculation may be carried out the same way as in the case of the ACA, described
in Appendix A.
U1CCA = U
1
C − C
1
T − C
1
I − C
1
C = 3130 − 630 − 1610 − 127.5 = 762.5
U2CCA = U
2
C − C
2
T − C
2
I − C
2
C = 2410 − 440 − 1265 − 80 = 625
U3CCA = U
3
C − C
3
T − C
3
I − C
3
C = 4365 − 965 − 1955 − 115 = 1330 (13)
In this case the total utility of players is UTCCA = 2717.5 in contrast to the ACA case
where, as we have seen, UTACA = 2320.
The total payments for the capacity rights in this case is 322.5 in contrast to the value
of 825 in the ACA case, while the ratios of allocated network capacities and used network
capacities (rANCCCA and r
UNC
CCA ) are both 0.2778, in contrast to the values r
ANC
ACA = 0.321 and
rUNCACA = 0.2963 calculated in the ACA case (there are no unused capacities in the CCA
case).
Naturally, this example is not a sufficient basis for reaching general conclusions about
the properties of the two methods, but is has been useful to demonstrate our models in
detail. in the next section we provide a simulation-based computational analysis for the
statistical comparison of the two methods.
3 Results
We used a computational approach to compare the performance of the ACA end CCA
methods. We generated random setups and simulated the capacity allocation processes to
determine the resulting capacity allocations and payments of the two methods.
Each setup was generated as follows. Input parameters were:
• The number of vertices (nodes) nv
• The number of edges ne
• The number of sources ns
• Upper and lower bounds for edge capacities qmax and qmin
• Upper and lower bounds for transfer costs CmaxT and C
min
T
• Upper and lower bounds for source costs CmaxS and C
min
S
In the first step, graph of the network was generated. The first edge was placed
randomly, the second was placed randomly among unconnected node-pairs and so on, until
all ne edges have been placed (see Erdős-Rényi graphs [5]). At the end, connectedness and
planarity of the resulting graph was checked, and if any property did fail, the process was
started over. Once the graph proved to be appropriate, ns nodes were picked at random
from the set of nodes, and they were defined as source nodes (the rest are considered as
consumer nodes in the following).
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In the second step, the parameters of edges were determined. Transfer costs for edges
were assumed to be identical in any direction, thus ne random values from a uniform dis-
tribution between qmin and qmax were picked, and rounded to the closest integer value to
determine maximal edge capacities, and similarly, random values from a uniform distri-
bution between CminT and C
max
T were picked, and rounded to the closest integer value to
determine edge transfer costs.
Following this step, the (maximum) 10 cheapest source-consumer routes were deter-
mined for every consumer, considering source and transfer costs as well. The minimal and
maximal values of these routes (CminRoute and C
max
Route) were calculated from the results.
In the following, supply and demand parameters were set as follows. ns random values
from a uniform distribution between CminS and C
max
S were picked, and rounded to the
closest integer value to determine the source costs.
Inverse demand functions were determined as follows. We assumed the three-step
piecewise constant form as in subsection 2.1.3, where the quantity of each step was deter-
mined by picking a random integer value from the interval [10, 50]. The price of each step
was determined by picking a random integer value from the interval [CminRoute + C
min
S , 1.4 ·
(CmaxRoute + C
max
S )].
We considered various network sizes each with different node, edge and source node
numbers (nv, ne, ns), but the other parameters were fixed as summarized in Table 4. For
each network size, 1000 setups were generated, on which the ACA and CCA methods have
been evaluated.
par. value par. value
qmin 10 qmax 90
CminT 3 C
max
T 11
CminS 20 C
max
S 30
Table 4: Invariant parameters used in the simulations
3.1 Results on 6-node networks
In this case nv = 6, ne = 8, ns = 1 were assumed. This resulted in an average route
length of 1.56 between consumers and sources in these networks.
Regarding the total resulting utility values and their difference (UTCCA − U
T
ACA), Fig.
3 depicts the distributions over the 1000 simulated cases.
The first thing we may notice is that in the ACA case there are scenarios, where UTACA
is negative. The reason for this is that in the ACA framework, it is possible that in the
process of capacity allocation such capacities will be allocated to players, which will be
useless for them as later they are determining their optimal flows on the capacities assigned
to them. We have seen this phenomenon in the simple example, where at the end of the
ACA process a capacity of 10 units on edge 3 has been assigned (see the matrix in eq.
(4)). Capacity payments for these unused capacities which do not form a full route at the
end of the process imply negative utility components for these players. If these negative
components outweigh the positive ones in the context of all players, UTACA may be negative
as well. This happens in the 19 % of the cases when we apply ACA.
16
-4000 -2000 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
104
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
104
0
50
100
150
200
250
Figure 3: Distributions of UTACA, U
T
CCA and of U
T
CCA − U
T
ACA over the 1000 simulations done
with 6-node networks.
Average values of UTACA and U
T
CCA are 2267.5 and 3213.1 in this case, while their
standard deviations are 2660.6 and 3224.7 respectively. As we see in Fig. 3, the CCA
method does not perform better in every case. In the 34% of cases, the ACA allocation
method results in higher UT values.
Regarding the income of the auctioneer, the average total capacity payments are 5424.3
and 4673 in the ACA and CCA cases respectively.
In addition, let us compare the ratios of the allocated and used network capacities
(rANC and rUNC).
rANCACA = 0.4601 r
ANC
CCA = 0.2489 r
UNC
ACA = 0.2286 r
UNC
CCA = 0.2489
Regarding the ’fairness’ of the auction method, several approaches and measures can
be used. In this work we restrain ourselves to a very simple indicator regarding this aspect.
For each simulation, we can calculate the difference of the maximal and minimal resulting
utilities among players, and average this value over the simulations. These ’unfairness’
indicator (UF ) results in the following values in the case of 6-node networks.
UFACA = 1772.5 UFCCA = 1390.8
Finally, let us note that the ACA method reached its final values in the 77.5% of the
simulated cases (in these cases no bids were submitted for the 3rd round).
3.2 Results on 9-node networks
In this case nv = 9, ne = 12, ns = 2 were assumed, resulting in an average route length
of 1.8739 between sources and consumers.
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Regarding the total resulting utility values, Fig. 4 depicts the distributions over the
1000 simulated cases.
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Figure 4: Distributions of UTACA, U
T
CCA and their difference over the 1000 simulations done with
9-node networks.
Average values of UTACA and U
T
CCA are 6231.9 and 7407.3 in this case, while their stan-
dard deviations are 4440 and 6105.7 respectively. The ACA method resulted in negative
total utilities in the 5.9 % of the simulated cases. Regarding this network size, the ACA
allocation method results in higher UT values in the 40.6% of simulated cases.
Regarding the income of the auctioneer, the average total capacity payments are 8240
and 7221.1 in the ACA and CCA cases respectively.
Let us note that as the network size increases, the average length, thus the average
total cost of routes is also increased. Since according to the simulation assumptions,
the inverse demand functions are determined based partially on the route costs, they are
also affected. These considerations explain the increasing trend in the utility values and
capacity payments.
The ratios of the allocated and used network capacities (rANC and rUNC) are as follows.
rANCACA = 0.4678 r
ANC
CCA = 0.28 r
UNC
ACA = 0.2601 r
UNC
CCA = 0.28
The ’unfairness’ indicators (UF ) are as
UFACA = 3339.8 UFCCA = 2496.0 .
The ACA method reached its final values in the 47.3% of the simulated cases (in these
cases no bids were submitted for the 3rd round).
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3.3 Results on 15-node networks
In this case nv = 15, ne = 20, ns = 3 were assumed, resulting in an average route length
of 2.503 between sources and consumers.
Regarding the total resulting utility values, Fig. 5 depicts the distributions.
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Figure 5: Distributions of UTACA, U
T
CCA and their difference over the 1000 simulations done with
15-node networks.
Average values of UTACA and U
T
CCA are 9272 and 12223 in this case, while their stan-
dard deviations are 7077 and 9353 respectively. The ACA method resulted in negative
total utilities in the 9.6 % of the simulated cases. Regarding this network size, the ACA
allocation method results in higher UT values in the 35.3% of simulated cases.
Regarding the income of the auctioneer, the average total capacity payments are 16555
and 14499 in the ACA and CCA cases respectively.
The ratios of the allocated and used network capacities (rANC and rUNC) are as follows.
rANCACA = 0.4928 r
ANC
CCA = 0.2758 r
UNC
ACA = 0.2416 r
UNC
CCA = 0.2758
The ’unfairness’ indicators (UF ) are as
UFACA = 5124.4 UFCCA = 3490.8 .
The ACA method reached its final values in the 24.2% of the simulated cases (in these
cases no bids were submitted for the 3rd round).
3.4 Results on 20-node networks
In this case nv = 20, ne = 30, ns = 4 were assumed, which resulted in an average route
length of 2.3514 between sources and consumers.
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Figure 6: Distributions of UTACA, U
T
CCA and their difference over the 1000 simulations done with
20-node networks.
Regarding the total resulting utility values, Fig. 6 depicts the distributions.
Average values of UTACA and U
T
CCA are 13635 and 17988 in this case, while their standard
deviations are 9149 and 13853 respectively. The ACA method resulted in negative total
utilities in the 5 % of the simulated cases. Regarding this network size, the ACA allocation
method results in higher UT values in the 38.2% of simulated cases.
Regarding the income of the auctioneer, the average total capacity payments are 23715
and 21644 in the ACA and CCA cases respectively.
The ratios of the allocated and used network capacities (rANC and rUNC) are as follows.
rANCACA = 0.4918 r
ANC
CCA = 0.2753 r
UNC
ACA = 0.2331 r
UNC
CCA = 0.2753
The ’unfairness’ indicators (UF ) are as
UFACA = 5849.7 UFCCA = 3947.5 .
The ACA method reached its final values in the 8% of the simulated cases (in these
cases no bids were submitted for the 3rd round).
4 Discussion
One of the the most importantly required characteristics of a capacity allocation method
is the efficiency in the terms of the resulting utility of players. This corresponds to the less
formal principle of ’capacities shall be allocated to those who value them most’. As the
simulations have shown, regarding this aspect, the proposed CCA method outperforms the
ACA in the majority of cases. The expected total utility of players over the analyzed high
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number (1000) of random scenarios was 18-41 % higher in the case of CCA. As the CCA
method always assigns network capacities to players in a way which ensures connected
paths, and is able to consider multiple alternative routes, it seems reasonable to presume
that these properties of the method result in higher gains in the case of larger networks
and more consumers.
If we analyze the results in the terms of allocation efficiency, we can see that the
ACA method always produces a higher allocation rate (rANCACA > r
ANC
CCA ), but the capacities
allocated this way can be only partially utilized by the players (see the rUNCACA values
and their relation to the rANCACA values). In contrast, if we consider the utilized allocated
capacities, the CCA method performs better in every case (rUNCCCA > r
UNC
ACA ).
Regarding the income of the auctioneer, the ACA method results in 8.73 - 13.85 %
higher values. This shows that (based on the detailed simulation results) the CCA method
is not the best choice if one aims to maximize the auction incomes. Let us however em-
phasize that in the case of ACA, the capacity payments partially correspond to products,
which are of no use in the final evaluation for the player.
Regarding the maximal difference between the maximal and the minimal utility among
players, simulation results show that the CCA method results in a more fair allocation.
In addition to the evaluation of the above quantitative measures, let us point out some
more differences between the two analyzed methods.
• In the proposed CCA framework the players place their bid for route-quantity pairs,
in contrast to the ACA framework, where bids are placed on single capacities.
• The ACA framework has usually multiple rounds (in the simulations, motivated
by the reality of the practical applications, 3 rounds were considered), and in each
round a significant number of steps are present. This means that players do have
to recalculate their evaluations in each of these steps. In contrast, in the CCA
framework, players evaluate their respective route-quantity pairs only once, at the
beginning of the auction, which allocates capacities and determines payments in one
single step.
• As optimal bidding is not trivial under the ACA framework (see subsection 2.3.2), in
other words, we may say that the computational burden is put to the participants in
the ACA case, where the clearing algorithm is simple, and in contrast, in the CCA
framework bidding is simple, and the clearing algorithm is more complex.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this work we proposed a convex combinatorial auction method (CCA) for the allocation
of capacities in capacity-constrained networks, where prior given transfer and source costs
apply and the evaluation of routes is subjective by the players. We compared the proposed
method with a 3-round ACA allocation method, which aims to model the current practice
of capacity allocation of natural gas networks in the EU. We performed simulations on
random networks, assuming only consumers as participants of the auction, to evaluate
the characteristics of these allocation methods. We found that while the ACA method in
average gives higher incomes for the auctioneer, the proposed ACA method in the majority
of cases results in higher and more fair resulting utility for the participants, and contributes
to the more efficient utilization of network resources.
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5.1 Future wwork
The explanation of the obtained results include some plausible, but still hypothetical
assumptions (e.g. the ACA framework performs worse if the average length of the transport
routes is higher), which have to be validated in further computational studies. In addition,
regarding the most important question, the possible future availability of the method,
several other studies have to be performed as well.
First of all, the current modelling studies considered only consumers as participants
of the auction, which is unrealistic. It is possible that under different assumptions, the
results will be significantly different. If we consider a setup where consumers may bid
for routes, but they are ready to take the gas at their ’doorstep’ as well (for reasonable
price), the behavior of producers wishing to market their gas for maximal profit may be
also included in the model. In this case, producers will also be present among participants
bidding for routes/capacities and more general results will be obtainable.
Second, as we have seen, the CCA method does not always provide better utility results
for players. It is straightforward to ask how the efficiency of the CCA method depends
on network topology and parameters, and more importantly, how would these methods
perform on more or less detailed models of the Eurasian gas network, the structure of
which is known, and its transfer and demand parameters are also known to some extent.
Although the introduction of the CCA method was the first step in the process of
this analysis, several more computational studies will be required to properly characterize
the practical applicability of the CCA method. In particular, the shortcomings of the
European capacity allocation methods might stem from other aspects as well in addition
to the intrinsic properties of the capacity allocation method used. We must note, that
changing the allocation mechanism might not be the easiest and most convenient way for
addressing the shortcomings.
In addition, we must note that the congestion problem seems an issue of limited sig-
nificance at the European gas networks nowadays, and might be even less of an issue as
gas consumption might fall due to decarbonization goals.
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Appendix A: The 3 rounds of ACA for the proposed
simple example
Round 1
As mentioned in the main text, in the initial step of the first round, all capacities of the
network are subject to the auction. This means that the initial vector of capacities under
auction (CaU(1)) may be written as
CaU(1) = [80 75 70 60 60 60 80 75 70 60 60 60] (14)
The initial price for every product is 0. In the first step, each player calculates its
optimal potential flows. As at this point none of the players has any allocated capacity,
straightforwardly, the faac vectors for each player will be qual to 0. On the other hand,
according to the concept proposed in subsection 2.3.2, the fcau vectors will be as
(
f1cua f
2
cua f
3
cua
)
=


0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
10 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
80 10 0
10 75 15
0 0 70
0 10 0
0 0 0
0 0 15


(15)
This will determine the bid quantities submitted (SBQ) in the first step
SBQ(1) =

 0 0 0 10 0 0 80 10 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 10 75 0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15

 (16)
where the first row corresponds to the bid quantities submitted by player 1, etc.
The next step is to calculate the sum of columns of (16), and determine the set of
products, for which there is overbidding and the set for which there is underbidding. If
we compare the bid sums
∑
SBQ(1) = [0 0 0 10 0 0 90 100 70 10 0 15]
with the capacity volumes under auction, now equal to the maximal edge capacities
detailed in table 1, we find that there is overbidding for line 1 and 2 in the negative
direction (columns 7 and 8). For these products, the price will be increased by 1 unit in
the next step, while for the others, the auction ends, and capacities are allocated to the
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bidders at their actual price. Thus, the matrix of allocated capacities (AC) after the first
auction step will be
AC(1) =

 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 0 15

 (17)
where, similarly to SBQ, row correspond to players. As players received these capacities
at their initial price (0), this step implies no capacity payments for the players.
In step 2, the only remaining products are the negative directional capacities of lines 1
and 2 (80 and 75 units respectively), at the price of 1 units. If we redo the calculations for
the optimal potential flows, considering the new prices, we get the same result as before
– in other words, we may conclude that the previously determined flows are still desired
by the participants, also in the case of higher capacity prices of the overbidded lines. This
means that they will submit the same bids for these products in this step as before.
If we continue this line of calculations, we find that that in step 4, after recalculating
optimal potential flows, player 2 drops its bid corresponding to line 1 (as the potential
flow on it no longer benefits him/her at the price of 3 for the line), thus the corresponding
product will be allocated to player 1 entirely at the price of 3, implying 240 units of
capacity payment for player 1.
Similarly, in step 6, player 1 also drops its bid corresponding to the negative direction
of line 2, but considering the bids of player 2 and 3, the overbidding remains (75+15>75).
This situation remains unresolved until step 9, when the recalculation of optimal potential
flows results in the following decision: Player 2 reduces its bid from 75 to 40. This can be
explained by the fact, that the increase of total cost (capacity + transfer + inlet payments)
implies that a flow of 75 units on line 2 is no longer profitable for him/her, but a flow of
40 is still is. The reason is that the quantity of the first step of the inverse demand curve
depicted in subsection 2.1.3 is equal to 40 units, and at this total price, this is the only
remaining demand part for which is worth to import the gas at this price.
This way the overbidding of line 2 in the negative direction resolves, and the resulting
allocated capacities of round one of the ACA may be written as
AC(8) =

 0 0 0 10 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 40 0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15

 . (18)
We may also summarize the final prices of the line capacities as
[0 0 0 0 0 0 3 8 0 0 0 0]
Considering the allocated amounts and the resulting prices above, the resulting capacity
payments in the first round are 240, 320 and 120 for players 1,2 and 3 respectively.
Next we calculate the actual optimal flows regarding the above allocation.
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(
f1aac f
2
aac f
3
aac
)
=


0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
80 0 0
0 40 15
0 0 70
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 15


(19)
We can see that the accessible quantities ensured after round 1 are 80, 40 and 85 for
player 1,2 and 3 respectively (the flow of 15 units in the case of player 3 includes two
edges, while the remaining flows are one-edge transfers). According to these quantities,
the inverse demand functions are updated as depicted in Fig. 7. The updated demand
curves will be used in the following ACA round.
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Figure 7: Updated inverse demand functions after the first round of ACA.
After the first round, player 1 has 10 units of unused capacity on line 4 in the positive
direction and player 2 has 10 units of unused capacity on line 4 in the negative direction.
Round 2
Following the first round, the second round is initialized via the determination of the
capacities under auction. This is done by subtracting the column sums of matrix (18)
from the vector (14).
CaU(2) = CaU(1)−
∑
AC(8) = [80 75 70 50 60 60 0 20 0 50 60 45] (20)
In addition all prices are reset to 0.
Before the first step of the second round, players determine their optimal potential
flows. IOn this case this results in the quantities summarized in eq. (21).
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(
f1aac f
2
aac f
3
aac f
1
cua f
2
cua f
3
cua
)
=


0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 10 20 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0


(21)
It can be seen in (21) that player 1 uses the already allocated free capacity of 10 units on
edge 1 (positive direction).
Thus, the submitted bid quantities (SBQ) in the first step of round 2 will be
SBQ(1) =

 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

 (22)
We proceed similar to round 1. After the first step we can see that there is overbidding
on product 8, namely the negative directional capacity of edge 2 (for all other products
the auction ends after the first step, and no capacities are allocated). In the second step,
as the price of the overbidded capacity is increased to 1, player 1 drops his/her bid, thus
the capacity is allocated to player 2 at the price of 1 at the end of step 2. The resulting
allocated capacities of round two of the ACA may be written as detailed in (23).
AC(8) =

 0 0 0 10 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 10 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15

 . (23)
Player 2 gets its capacity of 20 units at the price of 1, thus the capacity payment for
him/her is 20 units in this round.
Round 3
After the usual update of the CuA vector and the resetting of the prices, the optimal
potential flows are zero vectors for each player in this case. This means that no bids are
submitted in round 3, the final results of round 2 are the final results of the ACA process
in this case.
Evaluation of the results
Player 1
The total allocated capacity of Player 1 (AC1T ) is
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AC1T =
(
0 0 0 10 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0
)
. (24)
As it is also naturally reflected in the optimal flow calculations, player 1 is not able to
use the 10 units of capacity allocated on line 4 (+ direction), its final optimal flow f1ACA F
on the available capacities is described by the vector (25).
f1ACA F = [0 0 0 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 0 0]
T (25)
The utility of consumption may be calculated from the original inverse demand function
depicted in Fig. 2: U1C = 50 · 47 + 30 · 39 = 3520. The optimal flow implies the transfer
cost C1T = 720 and the inlet cost C
1
I = 1840. Player 1 paid a total amount of C
1
C = 250
during the ACA process, thus its resulting utility is
U1ACA = U
1
C − C
1
T − C
1
I − C
1
C = 710 (26)
Player 2
The total allocated capacity of Player 2 (AC2T ) is
AC2T =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 10 0 0
)
. (27)
The optimal flows of player 2 f2ACA F on the available capacities are described by the
vector (28).
f2ACA F = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 0 0 0]
T (28)
Considering that player 2 paid 330 units as capacity payment in the first round, and
40 in the second, its resulting utility may be calculated as
U2ACA = U
2
C − C
2
T − C
2
I −C
2
C = 2600 − 480− 1380 − 370 = 370 (29)
Player 3
The total allocated capacity of Player 3 (AC3T ) is
AC3T =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15
)
. (30)
The optimal flows of player 3 f3ACA F on the available capacities are described by the
vector (31).
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f3ACA F = [0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 70 0 0 15]
T (31)
The resulting utility of player 3 may be calculated as
U3ACA = U
3
C − C
3
T − C
3
I − C
3
C = 4365 − 965 − 1955 − 205 = 1240 (32)
Appendix B: CCA calculation details for the pro-
posed simple example
Derivation of CCA bids
In this subsection, we show how the parameters of the network and of the inverse demand
functions clearly define a set of bids according to the format described in subsection 2.4.1.
For the derivation of the plausible bid set in the case of the proposed example, let us
first consider the value of route 1 of player 1 (R11) as an example in the case of the amount
of 50 MMBtu. The source cost is 23, while the cost of edge 1 (the only edge of R11 is 9),
resulting in the total cost of 32 for route R11, which means a cost of 1600 in the case of 50
units.
On the other hand, considering the inverse demand function of consumer 1, depicted
in Fig. 2 we can see that 50 units of gas results in the consumption utility of 2350 units
(=47 · 50). Thus we may conclude that importing 50 units of gas via R11 produces a value
of 2350-1600=750 units for player 1. As in the current study we assume truthful bidding,
we assume that player 1 bid its true evaluation (750 units) for the route-quantity pair of
(R11, 50). Let us emphasize at this point that Players do not pay the nominal bidding value
for their accepted bids in the CCA framework (see subsection 2.5) – if player 1 had its bid
fully accepted, and he/she would pay 750 units for the capacity rights, its resulting utility
would be 0.
Let us now consider the same route in the case of 90 MMBtu (corresponding to the
second step of the inverse demand function of player 1). The total cost of the transfer and
the source may be derived similarly (90·32=2880), while the resulting utility is 50 · 47 +
40 · 39= 3910 in this case. Thus importing 70 units of gas via R11 can be evaluated to
1030 EUR by player 1. Regarding the third step of the inverse demand function, it can
be easily calculated that importing 95 units is not profitable via this route.
Based on the above calculations, let us thus assume that player 1 submits these two
bids for its first route:
B11,1 = (50, 750) B
1
1,2 = (90, 1030) (33)
What happens if both bids are partially accepted? As we stated before, the outcome
of the auction assigns a convex combination of the submitted bids to each player, so this
is a plausible scenario.
If only the first bid is partially accepted (0 < x11,1 < 1), the case is trivial – both the
price paid for the bid and the utility implied by the transport are multiplied by x11,1, which
is acceptable to player 1 (the net utility will be still 0 if the nominal price is paid).
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If the second bid is partially accepted (0 < x11,2 < 1), the situation may be even better.
Let us e.g. consider x11,2 = 0.6, meaning the import of 54 units via route R
1
1,2. The nominal
payment of Player 1 (not the realized payment, as emphasized before) for the route license
is 0.6 · 1030 = 618 units in this case. Importing 54 units implies a cost of 54 · 32 = 1728,
and the utility of 50 ·47+4 ·39 = 2506 which leaves player one with a surplus of net utility
of 160 units (=2506-(618+1728)).
This simple calculation demonstrates that because of the non-increasing inverse de-
mand functions, partial acceptance of bids corresponding to the second or further steps of
demand curves may be only beneficial for the players.
Similar to the evaluation of R11 all other routes of the players may be evaluated, and
for each step of the respective demand function, bids may be derived.
We consider only those bids, for which it is true that even its full acceptance is still
acceptable for the player (as we have seen this is not necessarily true for all the three
steps of the inverse demand function in every case). The numbers of bids corresponding
to various players and routes are summarized in the Table 5.
player Ri1 R
i
2 R
i
3 R
i
4 R
i
5
1 2 2 2 1 1
2 3 2 1 1 -
3 3 2 3 2 -
Table 5: The number of bids corresponding to various routes of players in the proposed example.
The quantities and prices of the submitted bids are summarized in Tables 6 and 7
respectively.
route (j) k=1 k=2 k=3
1 50 90 0
2 50 90 0
3 50 90 0
4 50 0 0
5 50 0 0
route (j) k=1 k=2 k=3
1 40 85 120
2 40 85 0
3 40 0 0
4 40 0 0
route (j) k=1 k=2 k=3
1 50 85 130
2 50 85 0
3 50 85 130
4 50 85 0
Table 6: The quantities of bids (qij,k) corresponding to players 1, 2 and 3 in the proposed
example.
route (j) k=1 k=2 k=3
1 750 1030 0
2 600 760 0
3 425 445 0
4 325 0 0
5 200 0 0
route (j) k=1 k=2 k=3
1 600 915 950
2 400 490 0
3 140 0 0
4 280 0 0
route (j) k=1 k=2 k=3
1 950 1475 1565
2 825 1263 0
3 850 1305 1305
4 675 1008 0
Table 7: The prices of bids (pij,k) corresponding to players 1, 2 and 3 in the proposed example.
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